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Slightly more than a year after ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in October 2003, the European Commission established the European Union Emissions Trading System (“EU- 
ETS”), a cap-and-trade system, to help implement its goals 
under the Kyoto Protocol.1 Now, as the reporting period for the 
Kyoto Protocol begins, the European Union (“EU”) is looking 
beyond 2012 and creating plans for the future. 
The EU-ETS has completed its first phase (2005–2007) and 
is currently beginning its second phase (2008–2012). In these first 
two phases, the EU-ETS was limited to installations in certain 
industries, namely energy activities, production and processing 
of ferrous metals, activities involving pulp and paper produc-
tion, and carbon dioxide emissions.2 Additionally, the structure 
of the EU-ETS centered on allocations through National Alloca-
tion Plans (“NAPs”) 3 and the predominantly free distribution 
of allowances.4 Each country submitted a NAP laying out its 
number of allowances and its allocation plan, then at the end of 
the year each country reported its emissions and could sell any 
leftover allowances.5 Thus, these initial EU-ETS phases estab-
lish the system, but are limited in scope.   
As the “cornerstone for the EU’s strategy for fighting cli-
mate change,” the EU-ETS must be continued and strength-
ened.6 To establish a proposal for phase three, the Commission 
used three guiding objectives: to fully exploit the potential of the 
EU-ETS to the EU’s overall greenhouse gas reduction commit-
ments; to refine and improve the EU-ETS based on experience; 
and to contribute to the transformation of Europe into a “low 
greenhouse-gas-emitting economy” and to create incentives for 
low carbon investment decisions by “reinforcing a clear . . . and 
long term carbon price signal.”7 
The Commission issued a draft proposal on January 23, 
2008 that included an overview of the provisions and specific 
language to amend the EU-ETS directive.8 This draft proposal 
acknowledges the EU commitment to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least twenty percent below 1990 levels by 2020.9 
The new proposal tries to create a more harmonized system to 
exploit the benefits of emissions trading and facilitate linking 
the EU-ETS with other emissions trading systems that may 
emerge while avoiding distortions in the market.10 In addition 
to increased harmonization, the proposal includes new industry 
sectors and new gases, which will allow for new investments 
and new abatement opportunities, hopefully leading to increased 
efficiency.11 The expansion of the EU-ETS to include more 
industries and gases other than carbon dioxide is a key provision 
in the fight against climate change.12 It is estimated that there 
will be six percent increase in coverage—about 120 to 130 mil-
lion tonnes of CO2-equivalent when compared to phase two and 
will cover almost half of Europe’s emissions.13 
Another key part of the proposal is the shift from individual 
country NAPs to a Community-wide quantity of allow ances.14 
The initial Community-wide cap will base the number of allow-
ances on the average total number of allowances issued by 
Member States during phase two.15 Additionally, it will create 
greater harmonization across countries by standardizing alloca-
tion rules, which will help prevent countries from having NAPs 
that favor certain industries.16 Further, the draft proposal calls 
for a decrease in allowances yearly from 2013 to 2020 so as to 
reduce overall emissions in a cost-effective way.17 Reducing 
allowances yearly will not only help the EU meet its emissions 
reduction goals, but do so in a way that avoids instability and 
uncertainty.  
The new draft proposal calls for the auctioning of allow-
ances, which is distinguishable from the initial phases of the EU- 
ETS, when most of the allowances were given away for free.18 
The draft calls for the full auctioning of allowances in the power 
sector, but for the free allocation of allowances in other sectors 
of industry initially, with a program to eliminate all free alloca-
tions by 2020.19 It is proposed that the power sector, due to its 
inclusion in the current EU-ETS scheme, have auctioned alloca-
tions, whereas other industries are given some free allowances 
to help adjust to the emissions trading system. Moreover, the 
draft proposal recognizes that some industries could suffer from 
“carbon leakage” due to international competition, thus it allows 
consideration of this factor in assessing whether to auction off or 
freely distribute allowances.20 Further, a portion of the proceeds 
from the auctioned allowances will go to programs designed to 
fight climate change and to adapt to its inevitable effects.21 
As the international community works towards a post-
Kyoto agreement, the EU has put forth a new plan to fight 
climate change with a focus on expanding and refining the EU-
ETS. The proposed changes in the EU-ETS show the steps the 
EU is taking to fight climate change in the upcoming decade. By 
expanding and harmonizing the EU-ETS, the proposal looks to 
the post-Kyoto world and the changes to come.
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